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ABSTRACT 
The Colombian Navy (COLNAV) has been outsourcing flight services from 
a private company since 2003 in order to provide transportation for troops and 
military cargo as well as general logistical support. The Colombian Naval 
Aviation’s (AVNA) lack of proper equipment to perform these types of missions in 
a cost-efficient manner has required the senior naval command to sign iterative 
contracts over four years, with a private contractor. The contract is with one of 
the two companies with such a capacity in the country, and the only one with the 
resources available to accomplish the terms of contract. 
Such limitations have developed a highly-dependent relationship with one 
supplier resulting in a non-beneficial agreement for COLNAV, especially 
considering the sensitive security implications of the internal Colombian context 
generated by the Narco-terrorist Organizations (ONT) within the national borders.  
This situation will be analyzed from a managerial perspective, and using a 
Game Theory approach, present four possible alternatives in order to strengthen 
COLNAV’s bargaining position when dealing with a sole source of aviation 
services and, thus, improve the Naval Aviation’s capabilities in the long run. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry 
out, nor more doubtful of success, nor dangerous to handle, than to 
initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all 
those who profit by the old order.  
Machiavelli 
 
A. THE COLOMBIAN NAVY IN CONTEXT 
Colombia is a privileged country. The diversity of its territory permits all 
kind of crops to grow with ease; several rivers within the national geography 
allow Colombians from all the cardinal points to communicate through “fluvial 
highways”; shores on two oceans, the Atlantic and the Pacific, provide the nation 
with access to a worldwide spectrum of opportunities. Ironically, Colombia’s 
greatest natural resources are also the reason for its biggest concerns.    
The Colombian Navy (COLNAV), through one of its components, the 
Colombian Marine Corps (COLMAR), is responsible for controlling its national 
rivers including denying their use to the Narco-terrorists Organizations (ONT) as 
a means of transporting collateral materials from urban centers to the drug-
processing labs in the jungle, and then from the jungle to their improvised 
wharves on the coast.   
COLMAR also has military jurisdiction over a portion of the northern 
Colombian territory known as “Montes de Maria” (Figure 1), considered to be the 
ONT’s mobility corridor to the Atlantic coast.   
Taking into account the vast territories and constraints that shape the 
state’s forces, the Colombian Military Forces (COLMIL) in general and  COLMAR 
in particular, support their strength with the ability to efficiently deploy the 
required military power to any given point within a brief period of time. Therefore, 
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air support is mandatory, not only to create a credible deterrence, but also to 
effect real coercion against the enemies of the nation.    
Consequently, almost a decade ago, the Colombian Naval Aviation 
(AVNA) restructured its mission to meet the demands of the country’s security. 
From a strategically oriented component, naval aviation turned into a tactical 
element, diverting and specializing parts of its resources to support COLMAR’s 
mission inside Colombian territory.  
 
 
Figure 1.   The Colombian Navy’s Territorial Jurisdiction 
From: World Atlas, available at:    
http://worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/samerica/lgcolor/cocolor.htm 
 





Over time, the troops’ high-mobility demands and logistical needs 
highlighted COLNAV’s limitations in air equipment. Therefore, almost since its 
new role was implemented, AVNA’s command realized the need for larger 
aircraft to support COLMAR’s operations.  
Resulting from the operational experience, COLNAV’s ground forces’ 
additional air requirements were defined in terms of two heavy helicopters 
permanently deployed, one on the Pacific coast and another on the Atlantic, with 
a minimum transportation capacity of 24 soldiers, fully equipped, or 4 tons of 
payload.   
After a market study in the country, it was determined that the helicopter 
that best fit these requirements (and was also currently operating in Colombia) 
was the Russian MI-17 (Figure 2). This decision was supported by the fact that 
the Colombian Army (COLAR), an enthusiastic proprietor of this type of aircraft, 
reported outstanding operating performance in all weather conditions of the 
Colombian topography. 
 
Figure 2.   Helicopter MI-17 
From: FAS Military Analysis Network, available at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-
101/sys/ac/row/mi-17.htm 
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Based upon the available resources during the initial decision-making 
process, COLNAV decided to outsource the required service instead of 
purchasing the aircraft. At this point, such a decision was viewed as a provisional 
measure to solve an urgent problem; however, it has been four years since then 
without the promulgation of any project that seeks to provide massive air mobility 
and logistic support for COLNAV.    
B. OUTSOURCING DEFENSE SERVICES IN COLOMBIA: 
UNDERSTANDING THE MARKET’S NATURE 
The defense sector in Colombia is strongly shaped by two factors: the 
governmental economic restrictions and the reduced number of private 
contractors with the required capacities. Also, legal restrictions inherited from the 
pre-open-market economy period, protecting domestic companies from foreign 
competitors, contribute greatly to defining the terms of negotiations faced by 
COLNAV when outsourcing strategic air services. 
According to AVNA’s “Estudio de Conveniencia y Oportunidad 
Complementario” (Opportunity and Convenience Complementary Study), there 
are only two companies in Colombia with the required capacities to accomplish 
the proposed types of missions. These companies are Vertical de Aviacion and 
Helistar S.A.; however, since 2003, the former has been the only offering 
company due to the lack of equipment availability from the latter. Moreover, 
according to the Colombian Aeronautical Regulations (RAC), it is against the law 
to contract foreign companies to operate aircraft within the country if there are 
competent national companies to execute the proposed mission.  
In conclusion, COLNAV’s spectrum of possibilities has been reduced to 
only one supplier of air support, Vertical de Aviacion (VA), a situation that not 
only leaves COLNAV in a disadvantaged position in the face of an almost-
monopolized business, but also introduces critical limitations to the planning and 
execution phases of any COLMAR military operation involving air support.   
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C. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
This thesis begins analyzing the COLNAV – VA relationship from a 
managerial perspective using theoretical frames that define the supply chain 
management principles. The strengths, weaknesses, threats, and opportunities 
to COLNAV, as a sole source of private air support, are identified. 
Air support is a core competency, not only to COLMIL, but also to any 
regular military force in the world. Therefore, once the theoretical frame 
describing in managerial terms, the pros and cons of COLNAV’s agreement 
regarding air support is defined, this thesis will address the same issue as a 
matter of strategic interest to the country and COLNAV.  It will also address the 
intangible but essential factors that highlight the importance of air support to 
accomplish COLNAV’s constitutional mission.  
Next, a game theory model will be implemented assuming COLNAV and 
VA as rational actors in order to describe a potential bargaining process at which 
both parts seek to obtain the greatest benefits for themselves. Conclusions 
obtained from the previous chapters of this thesis will be introduced in the game 
in order to support a matrix of possible outcomes for both players.  
D. HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The Colombian Navy should develop a short-term project to in-source the 
service’s requirements of air support, in order to implement its current operational 
capabilities, reduce risks derived from being in a weak position and in a non-
favorable commercial relationship, and optimize the use of the fiscal funds 
assigned. 
 COLNAV, facing increasing threats due to the Narco-terrorists 
Organizations (ONT) use of Colombian jurisdictional waters to transport illicit 
drugs and weapons, is required to keep its personnel, equipment, machinery, 
and weaponry at the highest level of readiness to deny the exploitation of the 
rivers and seas for illicit purposes. Outsourcing flight services from a private 
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contractor, in order to move troops and logistics, reduces COLNAV’s capacities 
to meet the operational demands derived from an increasingly complex internal 
conflict. Moreover, depending on a sole source of supply puts COLNAV in a 
disadvantageous position, denying opportunities to obtain a favorable agreement 
in terms of costs, and increasing the amount of risks resulting from being in a 
weak bargaining position. 
To prove this hypothesis, the following questions should be addressed: 
1. What are COLNAV’s air support needs?     
2. Are COLNAV’s air support needs met under the current terms of 
agreement with Vertical de Aviacion?   
3. Does the current relationship between COLNAV and Vertical de 
Aviacion provide the former with benefits that justify a long-term 
relationship?  
4. What options or arguments are available to COLNAV in a negotiation 
process that would improve its current relationship with Vertical de 
Aviacion? 
5. From a managerial perspective, is insourcing of air support a better 
option for COLNAV?     
E. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION 
There are several authors and studies that focused their interest in 
defining the principles of supply chain management. They analyze the 
relationships between the buyer and the supplier, as well as the particular 
context of the agreement, in order to identify opportunities to improve the 
participants’ outcomes. However, when it is about outsourcing critical services 
supporting the strategic capacities of a country’s defense sector, there are a 
number of intangible variables that need to be considered in order to identify the 
real dimension and priority of the relationship between government and 
contractors.  
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Chapter II provides an overview of COLNAV’s organization and its roles 
within the Colombian context of internal conflict. This chapter defines the needs 
for air support and brings into context the current agreement between COLNAV 
and Vertical de Aviation and introduces the economic and legal constraints that 
shape it. 
Chapter III addresses the conceptual models defining the supply chain 
management principles. The chapter encloses the COLNAV – Vertical de 
Aviacion agreement into a theoretical frame, highlighting COLNAV’S threats and 
opportunities in front of a player situated in a stronger position. Arguments from 
this chapter are intended to support future projects presenting COLNAV’s need 
for insourcing air support at higher levels of the Colombian government.   
Chapter IV presents a game theory approach modeling a hypothetical 
negotiation process between COLNAV and Vertical de Aviacion. This model 
adopts Allison and Zellikow’s theoretical frame, defining both players as rational 
actors, and introduces air-capacity strategic value as the principal factor 
determining COLNAV’s decisions. The purpose of this chapter is to provide 
COLNAV’s decision-makers with an alternative approach for future negotiation 
processes with Vertical de Aviacion, in order to strengthen the government 
position in the agreement.  
The concluding chapter summarizes the previous points and provides 
recommendations on how COLNAV can improve its current bargaining position 
as well as prepare the terrain to develop an internal air capacity that meets the 
demands of the country’s internal conflict.  
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II. OVERVIEW 
The reasonable man adapts himself to the world; the unreasonable 
one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore, all 
progress depends on the unreasonable man.  
George Bernard Shaw 
 
This chapter presents a synopsis of the structural organization and roles 
developed by the Colombian Navy. It defines the need for air support for its 
missions and the economic and legal constraints that shape the Colombian 
defense fund allocation and official contracting processes.   These processes are 
brought to light in order to understand the reasons considered in the decision-
making process for the current agreement between COLNAV and the private 
company providing air support to COLMAR’s troops.    
A. THE COLOMBIAN NAVY’S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
The Colombian Political Constitution1, under Title VII, Articles 216, 217, 
and 219, defines the Colombian Military Forces (COLMIL) primordial function and 
sets the basis for its organizational structure. According to this document, 
COLMIL has two main functions: (1) defense of the country’s sovereignty and 
independence and (2) integrity of the national territory and constitutional order.  
In order to allow COLMIL to attain its second objective, the Presidency of 
Colombia, through its Ministry of Defense (MDN), assigned portions of the 
country’s territory to each service. According to its constitutional mission,2 
COLNAV needs to “…exert presence and sovereignty over the Caribbean Sea 
                                            
1 Constitución Política de Colombia, (The Colombian Political Constitution), available at 
http://www.cna.gov.co/cont/documentos/legislacion/constitucion.pdf, p.62, Internet, accessed 
07/26/07. 
2 Armada Nacional Republica de Colombia (The Republic of Colombia Nacional Navy), 
available at www.armada.mil.co, Internet, accessed 07/30/07.  
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and the Pacific Ocean, as well as the Colombian fluvial arteries and different land 
jurisdictions with the purpose of maintaining territorial integrity and constitutional 
order.”3    
The COLNAV human and material resources are distributed in three naval 
forces located in the Caribbean, the Pacific, and the Amazon River. Both the 
Caribbean Naval Force (FNC) and the Pacific Naval Force (FNP) have 
operational control over a COLMAR brigade (BRIM-1 and BRIFLIM-2, 
respectively) located within their military jurisdiction, while the Southern Naval 
Force (FNS) has operational control over a COLMAR fluvial brigade (BRIFLIM-1) 
with headquarters in Bogota.     
According to COLNAV’s web-page,4 there are 12,660 kilometers (7,867 
miles) of navigable rivers in Colombia; 8,155 kilometers (5,067.5 miles) of them 
are covered by two COLMAR fluvial brigades. COLNAV also has 40,835 square 
kilometers (25,374.9 square miles) of territorial jurisdiction located in the northern 
region of the country. This area, which is known as “Montes de Maria,”  is part of 
the FNC military jurisdiction and has a strategic value for the Fuerzas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC).  It fronts numbers 35 and 37, as a mobility 
corridor, to transport illicit drugs from the country’s southern jungles to 
improvised wharves on the Caribbean coast, and then to the black markets in 
Central and North America, and Europe. 
Therefore, FNC demands from its COLMAR component, BRIM-1, to 
permanently conduct military operations in order to keep the ONTs from using 
the rivers and its surrounding territories to achieve their goals.  However, taking 
into account the vast territories that need to be covered by three regular 
battalions and two counter-guerrilla battalions integrating BRIM-15 FNC, as well 
                                            
3 Jurisdiccion de la Armada de la Republica de Colombia (Colombian Navy’s Jurisdition), 
available at: http://www.armada.mil.co/index.php?idcategoria=183, Internet, accessed 07/30/07.  
4 Ibid. 
5 Comando de Infanteria de Marina – BRIM-1 (Marine Corps Command – BRIM-1) available 
at http://www.armada.mil.co/index.php?idcategoria=537836, Internet, accessed 07/30/07.  
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as the other Colombian naval forces, is highly dependent on air support in order 
to exert opportune military presence and thus deter and coerce the ONTs in its 
jurisdiction. 
The Colombian Naval Aviation (AVNA) is a supporting unit organized in 
three squadrons or groups: the Caribbean Naval Air Group (GANCA), the Pacific 
Naval Air Group (GANPA), and the Naval Air Group of Fluvial Support and 
Transportation (GATAF). GANCA and GANPA were conceived to support FNC 
and FNP respectively, developing maritime and ground troop support operations, 
while GATAF, with headquarters in Bogota, is responsible for providing air back-
up to FNS’ fluvial operations.  
The list of rotary-wing assets comprising AVNA is integrated by five Bell-
412 helicopters and one Bell-212 helicopter employed as Command and Control 
units. There are also two AS555SN, one BK-117, and two BO-105 helicopters 
engaged in maritime operations and close-range fire support missions.6 Due to 
the abruptness of the Colombian territory, and the reduced number of safe 
airfields on regions separated from the centers of population, the employment of 
fixed-wing assets is limited to logistic missions from one major city to another as 
well as advanced command and control stations in support of rotary-wing aircraft 
missions.   
COLNAV current tactical and operational doctrines reflect US Navy, US 
Coast Guard, and US Marine Corps practices. Troops’ readiness, quick reaction, 
and air mobility are the pillars on which COLMAR founds its operations. In fact, 
considering that human and material assets are the critical variable in the 
organization, the ability to rapidly concentrate a number of troops and efficiently 




being an option, is COLMAR’s only approach to a prolonged conflict. This conflict 
has been set up this way by the ONTs  in an effert to defeat the state’s forces by 
draining its resources over time. 
 
 
Figure 3.   COLNAV Structural Organization 
 
From: Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments, available at: 
http://www2.janes.com/janesdata/sent/samsu/images/g0547511.jpg, accessed 08/02/07 
 
 
                                            
6 “JANE’S Sentinel Country Risk Assessments”, available at: 
http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/sentinel/SAMS_doc_view.jsp?Sent_Country=Colombia&Prod_
Name=SAMS&K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/samsu/colos130.htm@current#top, Internet, 
accessed 08/02/07.    
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The Colombian operational experience has showed that heavy 
helicopters7 are vital to execute and sustain efficient military operations. 
Unfortunately, AVNA cannot provide such supports to COLMAR with its current 
resources. In 2003, COLNAV decision-makers started seeking ways to provide 
the naval ground and fluvial forces with the air support they demanded. Their 
decisions were constrained by two factors: (1) the available budget, and (2) the 
current budget’s official execution laws. A brief description of the Colombian 
process of budget execution will be described in order to understand the course 
of actions adopted by COLNAV leaders in 2003.  
B. MANAGING OFFICIAL FUNDS IN COLOMBIA: UNDERSTANDING THE 
PROCESS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
The Colombian fiscal year runs from January 1 to December 31. 
According to “Estatuto Orgánico del Presupuesto General de la Nación” (Organic 
Statute for the Nation’s General Budget),8  the Colombian official funds are 
composed by the Budget of Rents, the Budget of Expenses, and the fiscal year’s 
General Dispositions.9 The former relates the amount of available funds, 
according to the estimated taxes that will be collected in the current fiscal period, 
while the latter shows the distribution of those funds among the ministries and 
administrative departments. The fiscal year’s General Dispositions comprise a 
number of specific norms and regulations that are effective for only one period 
and provide a general guideline to ensure the proper execution of funds. 
The Budget of Expenses provides operational funds only, which means 
that investments in new equipment cannot be made with these resources. If 
COLNAV wants to buy new equipment (i.e. new helicopters) or upgrade an 
existing one, it is mandatory for the service to submit a project to “Banco 
                                            
7 Heavy helicopters will be used in this document to signify rotary-wing aircraft capable of 
transporting more than 4 tons of payload. 
8 “Secretaria del Senado – Republica de Colombia” (Secretary of the Senate – Republic of 
Colombia), available at:  http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/leyes/D0111_96.HTM, Internet, 
accessed 08/05/07.   
9 Ibid, article 11.  
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Nacional de Programas y Proyectos” (National Programs and Projects’ Bank).10 
According to the Colombian budget statute, this organization approves funds to 
those projects considered viable socially, technically, and economically, and 
registered at “Departamento Nacional de Planeacion” (National Department of 
Planning).  
It usually takes three to four years, after getting approval, for a project to 
be funded, and another year or two to be executed. Investment projects are also 
extremely time and energy consuming ― it normally takes a year to prepare a 
project ― because they need to justify to congress the need for additional funds 
in such a way that it cannot be refuted, even by the most radical leftist 
congressman in the House.  
In the case of COLNAV and the need for massive air support, a potential 
project should include not only new helicopters and training, but also new 
personnel ― the number of COLNAV’s pilots and mechanics is a critical factor 
for the service11 ― new facilities,12 and an increment in the operational funds 
(Budget of Expenses) to cover the new demands of fuel, maintenance of 
equipment, and installations.  
By the time COLNAV decision-makers started looking for ways to provide 
troops with effective air support, they already knew that a project to acquire 
heavy helicopters would be almost impossible to accomplish in the near future 
considering the country’s economic restrictions and priorities. Therefore, they 
conceived another strategy: the outsourcing of air support. 
 The Organic Statute for the Nation’s General Budget, or simply the 
Budget’s Law as it is commonly known in Colombia, provides a monetary reserve 
                                            
10 “Secretaria del Senado – Republica de Colombia” (Secretary of the Senate – Republic of 
Colombia),  article 9. 
11 According to AVNA’s  recent Order of Battle, the pilot-to-aircraft ratio was 2.5:1.  
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named “Fondo de Compensacion Interministerial” (Inter-ministerial  
Compensation Fund),13 whose annual amount could be up to 1% of the nation’s 
current income. These resources are incorporated into the budget for covering 
gaps in the operational funds of entities and official organizations, during the 
fiscal period, and according to the President and his council of ministers’ criteria.  
In January of 2003, COLNAV’s leaders presented an official request to the 
council of ministers demanding additional funds to provide massive air support to 
the troops.14 In March of the same year, the COLNAV operational budget 
received an additional US$3,930,02015 to negotiate and execute a contract with 
a company capable of providing the required flight services.      
C.  SELECTING THE CONTRACTOR 
 COLNAV defined the need for air support according to the following 
terms: 
The Colombian Navy requires a company capable of providing 
rotary-wing flight services to transport up to 24 fully-equipped 
soldiers or 4 tons of payload within the Colombian national borders. 
The aircraft’s minimum flight autonomy should be of 3 hours and 30 
minutes and an operational flight radius of at least 125 nautical 
miles  
                                            
12 AVNA’s current facilities cannot support the operation and maintenance of two heavy 
helicopters. There is a project underway seeking approval to translate the actual facilities in 
Cartagena, 60 miles north, to Barranquilla, in order to gain more space to build new hangars and 
installations. The area in which the actual facilities are placed do not permit any improvement 
because it generates a conflict with the city’s international airport development project.    
13 Estatuto Organico del Presupuesto General de la Nacion (Organic Statute for the Nation’s 
General Budget) article No. 70, available at: 
http://www.dnp.gov.co/archivos/documentos/DDTS_Gestion_Publica_Territorial/1bnormatividadL
ey38_89.pdf, internet, accessed 08/25/07.    
14 Information extracted from “Estudio de Conveniencia y Oportunidad” (Convenience and 
Opportunity Study), a document required―according to “Estatuto General de Contratacion 
Publica” (General Statute of Public Contracting) Law 80, article 25―to evaluate and approve the 
object of the contract, based on the nation’s convenience. The document in question is not 
available to the public due to the classified nature of the information that it comprises; however, 
important statistical data can be extracted from it without violating any security clearance.    
15 Currency conversions are made using an equivalent of 1 dollar:2100 pesos, based on the 
2007 Colombian economic indicators available at: http://www.banrep.org/, internet, accessed 
08/25/07.   
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Offering companies should have at least 3 helicopters of such 
characteristics to be employed as follows: two helicopters 
permanently deployed in the Caribbean Naval Force – Cartagena – 
and the Pacific Naval Force – Bahia Malaga – respectively, and 
one helicopter available in case of operational emergencies, 
capable of immediate reaction to support the troops in the 
geographic area that the COLNAV demands. 
The costs of the contract should include those derived from the 
helicopter’s maintenance and operation, including but not limited to 
aircraft’s pilots and mechanics, combustible and lubricants.16 
The first obstacle COLNAV found in the process of selecting the supplier 
of flight services was at the “Reglamentos Aeronauticos de Colombia, (RAC)” 
(Colombian Aeronautic Regulations). According to the document, Aerocivil17 will 
grant temporary operation permits to foreign-licensed aircraft to operate in 
Colombia,  but only in the absence of national aircraft capable of doing the 
proposed missions.18 
This clause shut the door in the face of a number of foreign companies 
offering flight services to COLNAV.  Worse, it left the government at the mercy of 
the only two Colombian companies with the required aircraft to perform the 
demanded service: Helistar Ltda. and Vertical de Aviacion.19  
Helistar Ltda., owner of three Russian MI-17 helicopters and a number of 
American Bell light-helicopters, has been the main supplier of air services to the 
Colombian Oil Company (ECOPETROL) and thus a considerable percentage of 
                                            
16 Extracted from AVNA’s “Estudio de Conveniencia y Oportunidad” (Convenience and 
Opportunity Study), February of 2003, free translation to English by the author.   
17 Aerocivil is the abbreviated version of “Unidad Administrativa Especial de Aeronautica 
Civil” (Special Administrative Unit of Civil Aeronautics) the Colombian entity regulating the 
employment of the national air-space.  
18 Reglamentos Aeronauticos de Colombia, RAC, (Colombian Aeronautic Regulations), Part 
Three, Item 6.3.7.5, p. 73, available at: 
http://www.aerocivil.gov.co/RAC/Parte3/PARTE_TERCERA.pdf, Internet, downloaded 08/20/07.  
19 Information about these companies is available at: http://www.helistaraviacion.com, and 
http://www.verticaldeaviacion.com/, internet, accessed 08/12/07.   
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its assets are devoted to honor this long-term contract.20 Therefore, Vertical de 
Aviacion has been the only company available to COLNAV since 2003 due to the 
lack of equipment availability from its competitors.       
Vertical de Aviacion, the country’s largest non-regular civil-aviation 
company, started operating in 1982 with Bell equipment, and according to its 
web-page, was the first company in the world offering commercial services for 
load and passenger transportation using Russian aircraft. Today, the company 
owns fourteen MI-17s and a number of Bell 222 and Bell 212 helicopters. Vertical 
de Aviacion not only sells flight services and maintenance to the Colombian 
government, but also to Mexico, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, the United States 
Department of Defense, and the American embassy in Colombia.   
Moreover, Vertical de Aviacion controls the civil non-regular air 
transportation in Colombia. According to Aerocivil statistics, the company’s 
helicopters moved 57.58% of the total cargo and 49.71% of the total personnel, 
using rotary-wing aircraft as a means of transportation, in Colombia during 
2006.21  
Taking into consideration the characteristics of the rotary-wing industry in 
Colombia, the contractor’s selection should have been an easy task for the 
COLNAV decision-makers: Vertical de Aviacion has been the only option 
available since 2003. Both sides, supplier and supplied, are aware of it.  
According to AVNA’s latest market research,22 as a requisite to sign the 
current fiscal year’s contract, Vertical de Aviacion will charge the navy an amount 
of US$5,497 per flight hour during 2007. Considering the funds assigned to 
                                            
20 Information extracted from AVNA’s “Estudio de Conveniencia y Oportunidad 
Complementarios – Anexo B, Estudio de Mercado” (Convenience and Opportunity 
Complementary Study – Annex B, Market Research), January of 2007.   
21 “Boletin Trimestral No-Regular” (Non-regular Quarterly Report), available at:   
http://www.aerocivil.gov.co/ , internet, accessed 08/12/07.   
22 AVNA’s “Estudio de Conveniencia y Oportunidad Complementarios – Anexo B, Estudio de 
Mercado” (Convenience and Opportunity Complementary Study – Annex B, Market Research), 
January of 2007.   
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COLNAV to cover this agreement, the COLMAR troops would have an average 
of only 20 hours of flight support per month in the Caribbean and the Pacific.23   
Table 1 provides a summary of the costs incurred by COLNAV in order to 
provide flight transportation to the COLMAR troops and cargo. From the graphic 
below, it is evident that there is a decreasing tendency in the funds allocated to 
cover the contract with Vertical de Aviacion. This, along with the fact that 
Colombia is an inflationary economy (on average, inflation increases 6% per 
year24) denotes that in the near future, the funds allocated will be insufficient to 
cover the required services.     
 
 
Table 1.   Costs of Flight Services  
From: AVNA’s “Estudio de Conveniencia y Oportunidad” (Convenience and Opportunity 
Study), January of 2007 (Values in US Dollars) 
 
                                            
23 According to AVNA’s “Estudio de Conveniencia y Oportunidad” (Convenience and 
Opportunity Study ), January of 2007, this year’s funds’ allocation was US$2,857.143. 
24 Banco de la Republica de Colombia – Indicadores Economicos (The Republic of 
Colombia’s Bank – Economic Indicators), available at: http://www.banrep.gov.co/, Internet, 
accessed 08/24/07.   










D.  CONCLUSION  
This chapter showed the structural organization of COLNAV to accomplish 
its constitutional mission of defending the integrity of the national territory. It was 
also proven that the actual resources the institution counts on are insufficient to 
cover the areas under its jurisdictional responsibility. COLNAV assets are 
geographically concentrated and highly dependent on air mobility in order to 
keep the ONTs from acting against the law and constitutional order. However, 
since AVNA has neither the helicopters to provide the troops with massive 
transportation nor funds to purchase new and larger aircraft, COLNAV needed to 
find a way to fulfill this requirement using external resources.  
The Colombian aeronautical regulations forbidding foreign competition 
reduced COLNAV’s options of flight service outsourcing to only one: Vertical de 
Aviation. This resulted in an unfavorable agreement for COLNAV, assuming a 
weak bargaining position in front of a sole-source supplier. The amount of funds 
allocated each year to cover this agreement is decreasing and the possibility that 
Vertical de Aviacion will decide to manipulate the terms of the contract in its favor 
before finishing it, is a significant threat for COLNAV. 
It is imperative to find alternatives to improve COLNAV’s current position 
with respect to its flight services provider. Paraphrasing George Bernard Shaw 
again, progress rewards unreasonable thinking. However, for innovative 
approaches to be realistic, a detailed understanding of the problem ― the 
COLNAV-Vertical de Aviacion relationship in this case ― is required. That is the 
proposed goal of the following chapter.        
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III.  OUTSOURCING DEFENSE SERVICES IN COLOMBIA: A 
MANAGERIAL ANALYSIS 
“Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?” 
asked Alice. 
“That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,” said the 
Cat. 
“I don’t much care where…,” said Alice. 
“Then it doesn’t matter which way you go,” said the Cat. 
“…so long as I get SOMEWHERE,” Alice added as an explanation. 
“Oh, you’re sure to do that,” said the Cat, “If you only walk long 
enough.” 
Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland 
 
The previous chapter explained the COLNAV organization and the context 
in which the outsourcing of flight services was conceived. This chapter will 
analyze the current relationship between the Colombian government and Vertical 
de Aviacion from a managerial perspective. 
There are many models to evaluate and classify a business relationship 
between two or more parties. The authors of these theories studied commercial 
relationships in a traditional business environment, omitting the particular 
characteristics that constitute a country’s defense sector. Therefore, in order to 
have a contextualized analysis of a business relationship where the objective is 
to provide a nation’s military forces with a core competency, additional factors 
besides the economical, should be considered. 
A country’s security and internal order are good examples of these 
additional variables, giving a special shape to a business relationship like the one 
between COLNAV and Vertical de Aviacion. An economic value that represents a 
country’s sovereignty cannot be calculated: the life of all of its citizens is its 
worth. Therefore, COLNAV will keep outsourcing flight services–one of the 
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Colombian pillars of internal order–until it develops the internal capacity to 
provide its troops with air support, despite the costs involved in the agreement. 
 COLNAV’s high dependency on the outsourced service, however, does 
not have to constitute a disadvantageous agreement with its supplier. In order to 
achieve a stronger, better position, it is mandatory for COLNAV to first 
understand the actual relationship and thus identify the weaknesses and 
potential opportunities for COLNAV, and then to model a bargaining process in 
which the service can make the most of the relationship and use it to project the 
development of its own core competencies.     
A. STRUCTURAL CONCEPTS 
1.  Core Competencies 
Michael Porter’s definition of a firm’s competitive advantage, “… [its talent 
to produce at] lower costs than its rivals or its ability to differentiate and 
command a premium price that exceeds the extra cost of doing so…,”25 
describes a corporation’s core competency in a globalized world, and thus its 
ability to sustain a competitive advantage. Such corporations tend to rely on the 
capacity of the individuals at the firm’s strategic apex to identify and integrate 
other companies’ core competencies into one final and complex product (or 
service) providing what is required–according to Jay Barney26–to implement a 
“…value creating strategy not simultaneously being implemented by any current 
or potential competitors and… unable to be duplicated.…” 
Citing Prahalad and Hamel, “…at least three tests can be applied to 
identify core competencies in a company. First, a core competency provides 
potential access to a wide variety of markets… second, a core competency 
                                            
25 Michael E. Porter, “Towards a Dynamic Theory of Strategy,” Strategic Management 
Journal, Vol. 12, Special Issue: Fundamental Research Issues in Strategy and Economics, 
(Winter, 1991). 
26 Jay Barney, “Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage” Journal of 
Management, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1991.  
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should make a significant contribution to the perceived customer benefits of the 
end product… finally, a core competency should be difficult for competitors to 
imitate. And it will be difficult if it is a complex harmonization of individual 
technologies and production skills…”27 
Complementing this definition with Quinn and Hilmer’s “Essence of Core 
Competencies,”28 core competencies consist of “…skill or knowledge sets, not 
products or functions…” meaning that a firm’s strategic apex should focus on the 
intellectual skills or management systems that actually create a sustained 
competitive advantage.  
  As deduced from the previous statements, COLNAV’s core 
competencies are those capacities and skills that constitute the essence of the 
institution and in which the achievement of its missions are supported. A number 
of them are intangible, such as leadership, commitment, and the moral standards 
of its members, for example, but others are tangible and measurable, like the 
capacity to exert presence and control over jurisdictional waters, or to deploy 
forces to any part of the national territory as a representative of the state’s 
authority. 
Even though COLMIL is not facing competition for a particular market or 
customer, as is the case in a business environment, its final product–security and 
internal order–should be perceived by the citizens as an inimitable service by any 
other organization, a sine qua non condition to assure the state’s integrity and 
authority over its territorial domains.   
From an operational perspective, the means to implement its core 
competencies is what differentiates the state’s legitimate forces from  subversion. 
Therefore, a successful military organization needs to efficiently integrate the 
available technology with its members’ abilities and training in order to pose a 
                                            
27 C. K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel,  “The Core Competence of the Corporation,” Harvard 
Business Review, May-June, 1990,  79-91. 
28 James Brian Quinn and Frederick G. Hilmer, “Strategic Outsourcing,” Sloan Management 
Review, Summer 1994, 43-55.  
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credible deterrence to its potential “competitors,” and thus guarantee internal 
order and the submission of its citizens to the authority of the state. 
Air support is one of several differentiating activities positioning  COLNAV 
in its context. It provides the troops with the capacity to exert an opportune and 
effective presence wherever they are required, thus, enabling the institution to 
develop a “sustained competitive advantage” over its competitors. Therefore, 
such a “product” should be the result of an in-house capacity, instead of an 
outsourcing contract. Citing Hays and Pisano, “…the items or services that 
should be made or conducted in-house are those that require capabilities that are 
closely linked with the core competencies and are mutually reinforcing, as 
opposed to those that can be separated. This is the fundamental strategic 
consideration that guides the original make-or-buy decisions that ultimately 
shape the character of the firm…”29            
2.  Buyer – Supplier Relationships  
According to Burt, Dobler and Starling,30 there are three types of buyer-
supplier relationships having a number of activities and attributes specific to each 
one: (1) Transactional, (2) Collaborative, and (3) Alliance. 
Transactional relationships are characterized by the fact that neither party 
is especially interested in the well-being of the other: what one actor wins, the 
other loses. This type of agreement reduces the possibilities of communication 
between the parties and demands a considerable amount of time and energy to 
monitor the proper delivery and quality of the outsourced good or service. It can 
also be inflexible when flexibility is required, and transactional suppliers tend to 
provide the minimum service required. 
                                            
29 Robert B. Hays and Gary Pisano, “Beyond World Class: The New Manufacturing 
Strategy,” Harvard Business Review, January/February 1994, vol 72/1, 77-87.  
30 David N. Burt et al., “World Class Supply Management, The Key to Supply Chain 
Management,” 7th Ed., McGraw-Hill – Irwin, Boston, 2003.   
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Collaborative and Alliance relationships differ from transactional in both 
interdependence and cooperation between parties, reducing the risks of supply 
disruptions, lowering costs, and increasing the products/services quality. These 
types of relationships demand a complex web of formal and informal 
interconnections, information systems, and specific structures, to enhance 
learning,  which results in long-term agreements between the parties. 
Burt, Dobler and Starling31 propose a number of key questions to 
determine what kind of relationship is more appropriate for a particular 
organization. So far, it is clear that COLNAV–Vertical de Aviacion is a typical 
transactional relationship; however, by answering the following questionnaire, the 
appropriate relationship for COLNAV with an outsourced flight services company 
can be determined. 
1. Are there many relatively undifferentiated suppliers providing what 
amounts to interchangeable commodities? Chapter II proved that Vertical de 
Aviacion is the country’s only company offering the required service. A 
transactional relationship is not recommended under these circumstances. 
2. Does the supplier posses economic power that it is willing to use over 
its customers? This is not the case, since the customer is the Colombian 
government and is not affected by a company’s economic power. However, there 
are means other than economic that the supplier is currently using to exert 
pressure over COLNAV. The authors recommend a collaborative relationship in 
this case. 
3. Are some suppliers strategic to your business? In other words, do they 
have a major impact in your competitive advantage32 in the marketplace? Are 
you highly reliant on them to provide a unique product, technology, or service? If 
so, an alliance may be vital.  
                                            
31 David N. Burt et al, “World Class Supply Management, The Key to Supply Chain 
Management,” 7th Ed., McGraw-Hill – Irwin, Boston, 2003, p. 86. 
32 As it was stated previously, COLNAV is highly reliant on flight support to achieve a 
sustained competitive advantage over its competitors. 
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4. Would COLNAV benefit greatly if Vertical de Aviacion were more 
integrally connected with the institution, perhaps with their engineers working 
side by side with the militaries, or locating their maintenance facilities next to the 
military installations? This is a very important issue for COLNAV, since the first 
and most practical step to begin a process of in-sourcing the flight services is by 
learning how to operate the equipment. For this reason, an alliance might be 
considered. 
In conclusion, COLNAV would receive a better service by implementing an 
alliance with Vertical de Aviacion. A collaborative relationship might be a good 
first step for this purpose. However, as it will be observed in the following 
paragraphs, the outsourcing company will need powerful reasons to consider a 
relationship, other than transactional, with COLNAV. 
3.  Supplier Supremacy 
According to Lonsdale, “…The significance of asset specificity for 
outsourcing is that if activities that require ‘transaction-specific investments’ are 
outsourced, the firm will find itself locked into its supplier, as it will not want to 
write off those investments by revisiting the market. This lock-in can be exploited 
by the supplier, by renegotiating the terms of the contract or insisting on different 
terms next time around. This post-contractual lock-in (dependency) will cause the 
power relation between the two parties to change – the situation can become one 
of supplier dominance…”33 Contextualizing this definition, COLNAV is in a lock-in 
situation with Vertical de Aviacion because, even though there are not 
transaction-specific investments involved in the outsourcing agreement, in the 
economic terms that the author considers them, the troops are already trained–
and used–to operate with the particular type of aircraft offered by Vertical de 
Aviacion.  A change of equipment, if available, would generate a new training 
                                            
33 Chris Lonsdale, “Locked In to Supplier Dominance: On the Dangers of Assets Specificity 
for the Outsourcing Decision,” The Journal of Supply Chain Management, May, 2001. 
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process for the troops, and an initial reduction of readiness and operational 
effectiveness that would not be supportable by COLNAV. 
4.  Strategic Vulnerabilities 
Michael Porter states, “…when you outsource something, you tend to 
make it more generic, you tend to lose control over it. You tend to pass a lot ….to 
your suppliers. That creates strategic vulnerabilities and also tends to 
commoditize your product…”34 The most relevant disadvantage of outsourcing is 
the highly dependent relationship that the firm establishes with one supplier. This 
condition may engender two undesired outcomes, one external and the other 
internal to the firm: (1) real problems can occur when the single supplier deviates 
from the company’s main objectives, what a number of authors call “loss of 
alignment,” generating a protracted process to search for a new supplier that 
meets the COLNAV priorities, or even worse, resigning to them in the absence of 
another source, and (2) by outsourcing a key service, COLNAV may lose its own 
strategic flexibility to introduce new tactics when it wants, rather than when the 
supplier permits a change.   
B. DIAGNOSING THE CASE 
Peter Kraljic, director of a consulting firm based in Germany, developed a 
model to help companies guard against supply disruptions, cope with the threats 
posed by a permanently changing environment, and seize the opportunities 
residing in a company’s actual agreements. In his article, published by Harvard 
Business Review,35 Kraljic cites a number of examples in which world-class 
companies developed unexpected approaches to cope with uncertainties and 
supply or price disruptions. Instead of simply monitoring their contexts, the author 
suggests that managers must “…make things happens to [their] own 
                                            
34 Michael Porter quoted in Burt et al. Emphasis added.  
35 Peter Kraljic, “Purchasing Must Become Supply Management. How Managers Can Guard 
Against Material Disruption by Formulating a Supply Strategy,” Harvard Business Review, 
September-October, 1983, 107-117. 
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advantage…”36 He concludes that a total change from an operational to a 
strategic perspective is a mandatory condition for future successes. Companies, 
therefore, need to replace purchasing processes by supply chain management in 
order to ensure the long-term availability of critical materials and services. 
Kraljic states that a company’s supply strategy must be determined by two 
variables: (1) the strategic importance of purchasing in terms of the value added 
and their impact in profitability, and (2) the complexity of the supply market 
gauged by supply scarcity, availability of substitutes, entry barriers, logistics cost 
or complexity, and monopoly or oligopoly conditions. A proper analysis of these 
variables will provide an organization’s top management with arguments to 
define the supply strategy needed to exploit its purchasing power and reduce  
associated risks. New opportunities and/or serious vulnerabilities might be 
exposed as a result of this process.  
Figure 4 is developed from Kraljic’s “Stages of Purchasing 
Sophistication,”37 adjusting his concepts to COLNAV’s context.  According to this 
matrix, COLNAV is facing conditions that demand a Supply Management 
strategy since both the importance of outsourcing and the complexity of the 
supply market are high. This is evident by the fact that flight service is a strategic 
item for COLNAV, which is provided by a pseudo-monopoly supported by strong 
entry barriers, eliminating any possibility of a substitute. 
Once the required type of strategy is defined, Kraljic offers the following 
steps to implement it: “…the company first classifies all its purchased materials 
or components in terms of profit impact and supply risk. Next, it analyzes the 
supply markets for these materials. Then, it determines its overall strategic 
supply position. Finally, it develops material strategies and action plans….”38  
 
                                            
36 Kraljic, 110. 
37 Ibid., 111. 
38 Ibid., 112. 
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Figure 4.   COLNAV Stages of Outsourcing Sophistication  
 




Contextualizing this model, COLNAV should first classify the outsourced 
service in terms of the value that it represents for the organization’s 
accomplishment of mission and the level of supply risk. Then, it must analyze the 
supply markets and the overall strategic supply position to define improved 
outsourcing strategies and action plans. 
1.  Phase 1: Classification 
The value of the outsourced services can be defined in terms of the 
impact that not having them would generate in the process of mission-
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accomplishment. Supply risk is “…assessed in terms of availability, number of 
suppliers, competitive demand…and substitution possibilities…”39 Using this 
criteria, COLNAV can classify the items outsourced or purchased into four 
categories according to their strategic value for mission accomplishment. These 
categories are: (1) Strategic – high mission accomplishment value / high supply 
risk, (2) Bottleneck – low mission accomplishment value / high supply risk, 
(3)Leverage -  high mission accomplishment value / low supply risk, and (4) Non-
critical – low mission accomplishment value / low supply risk. Each condition 
demands a specific approach with an increasing complexity as the strategic 






   
 




Figure 5.   COLNAV – Vertical de Aviation  Relationship Classification   
 
After Peter Kraljic, “Purchasing Must Become Supply Management,” Harvard Business 
Review, Sept-Oct/83. 
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Figure 5 shows a graphic interpretation of the classification matrix 
contextualized for the COLNAV-Vertical de Aviacion relationship. Considering the 
air support’s relevance for COLNAV’s mission, and the fact that only one 
company in the country can provide the troops with the demanded service, 
aggravated by the restrictions imposed by the Aerocivil’s laws protecting 
domestic companies, the COLNAV-Vertical de Aviacion relationship is defined as 
Critical. 
2.  Phase 2: Market Analysis 
In this phase, the model weights the bargaining power of Vertical de 
Aviacion against COLNAV’s strengths as a customer. This is obtained through a 
systematic review of the market and an analysis of  COLNAV’s needs and supply 
lines in order to gauge its ability to get the kind of supply terms it wants. 
Extracted from the original model, the criteria applicable to the COLNAV-Vertical 


















Outsourcing Portfolio Evaluation Criteria 
VA Strengths COLNAV Strengths 
1 
Market Size versus Supplier Capacity 
VA has a relatively strong position in the Colombian 
sector of non-regular air transportation. According to 
Aerocivil,40 48% of the non-regular passengers 
during 2004 were transported by Vertical de 
Aviacion. There are 14 MI-17 currently operating for 
the company, the country’s biggest fleet of this type. 
Outsourcing Relative Size versus Capacity of 
Main Units. 
The number of aircrafts involved in the COLNAV-
Vertical de Aviacion contract represents 
approximately 18% of the total aircrafts of this type 
for the supplier. Therefore, COLNAV is not in a 
relatively strong bargaining position with Vertical de 
Aviacion, according to the outsource size.     
2 
Cost and Price Structure 
Vertical de Aviacion was the first company in the 
world offering passenger and load transportation 
using Russian equipment,41 Nowadays they have 
integrated repair and maintenance shops for 
aircrafts and components, reducing their cost and 
price structure. 
Cost and Price Structure 
 COLNAV’s helicopter fleet is integrated by U.S. 
and European-made aircrafts. The organization 
does not have the personnel or facilities to operate 
and maintain this type of equipment.  
Table 2.   Outsourcing Portfolio Evaluation Criteria 
After Peter Kraljic, “Purchasing Must Become Supply Management,” Harvard Business 
Review, Sept-Oct/83. 
                                            
40 “Boletin Trimestral Empresas de Transporte Aereo No Regular, Trabajos Aereos 
Especiales y Actividades Conexas” (Quarterly Report of Non-Regular Air Transportation 
Companies, Special Air Works, and Related Activities) October- December, 2004, available at: 
http://www.aerocivil.gov.co/Estadisticas/trimestral/oct-dic04 , downloaded 06/10/07.   
41 Vertical de Aviacion, Company Information, available at: 
http://www.verticaldeaviacion.com/ , downloaded 06/10/07.  
42 According to the company’s web-site, Vertical de Aviacion  has 14 MI-17 helicopters 
currently under operation; 2 of them are permanently deployed in a naval base and they should 
also have another helicopter available for operational emergencies. Therefore, the break-even 
factor was calculated by dividing the total number of aircrafts by 2.5 (2 currently under 
deployment and 1 partially committed). 
3 
Break-even Stability 
Vertical de Aviacion commits 17.85%42 of its MI-17 
fleet to fulfill the contractual obligations with 
COLNAV. Therefore, Vertical de Aviacion can 
provide its service at lower cost than its closest 
competitor in the country; however, this fact also 
defines the supplier as a proven tougher bargainer, 
for it can more easily delay negotiations and accept 
capacity underutilization.  
Cost of non-delivery 
Cost of non-delivery cannot be stated in financial 
terms by the buyer; therefore, due to the sensitivity 
of the required service, costs in terms of mission 
success are not bearable by COLNAV.   
4 
Entry Barriers (Capital and Know-how 
Requirements 
There are high entry barriers for new competitors in 
the Colombian commercial-aviation sector. The 
elevated costs derived from obtaining the operating 
licenses, added to the fact that there are no un-filled 
gaps in the non-regular air transportation market, 
deter new companies from entering the business.    
Entry Costs for New Sources versus Cost for 
Own Production  
Assuming that new sources are not likely to be 
available in the short run is a strong argument to 
support the need for insourcing the troops’ air 
transportation in the near future. However, 
economic factors reduce any possibility of in-
sourcing the required flight support. 
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3. Phase 3: Strategic Positioning 
During this phase, the outsourced company43 identifies areas of 
opportunity or vulnerability, assesses supply risks, and derives basic strategic 
thrusts for these items from an Outsourcing Portfolio Matrix. Quoting Kraljic 
again:  
The cells in the [Outsourcing] Portfolio Matrix correspond to three 
basic risk categories, each associated with a different strategic 
thrust. On items where the company plays a dominant market role 
and suppliers’ strength is rated medium or low, a reasonably 
aggressive strategy (‘exploit’) is indicated. Because the supply risk 
is slight, the company has a better chance of achieving a positive 
profit contribution through favorable pricing and contract 
agreements… [when] suppliers are strong, the company must go 
on the defensive and start looking for….new suppliers…[O]n the 
other hand, undue aggressiveness could damage supplier relations 
and lead to retaliation. In this case, a company should pursue a 
well-balanced intermediate strategy (‘balance’)….usually, a 
company will find itself in different roles with respect to different 
items and suppliers. When it can bargain from a position of 
strength, it should press for preferential treatment. Bargaining from 
weakness, the company may have to offer inducements…in order 
to ensure an adequate supply…44   
                                            
43 In this context, “the company” refers to the role played by COLNAV in the outsourcing 
agreement.  
44 P. Kraljic, p. 114, emphasis added. 
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Table 3.   Outsourcing Portfolio Matrix 
From Peter Kraljic, “Purchasing Must Become Supply Management,” Harvard Business 
Review, Sept-Oct/83. 
 
The COLNAV-Vertical de Aviacion agreement is positioned in the bottom-
left corner of the outsourcing portfolio matrix due to COLNAV’s reduced strength 
in a restricted supply market; therefore, the recommended action is to diversify. 
In order to achieve this goal, COLNAV needs to increase spending on market 
research or consider developing an in-house capability through backward 
integration. The fact is that COLNAV has an urgent need of supply options  
4.  Phase 4: Action Plans 
 COLNAV is in a situation in which the supplier’s strengths outweigh the 





















only one with real benefits) recommended to reduce the long-term risk of 
dependence on a single source: achieve the in-house capability of massive troop 
transportation and logistical support.  
Considering budgetary constraints, capacity problems, and limitations, the 
only alternative available to COLNAV is to continue outsourcing, but under a 
carefully crafted and managed contract. In the following chapter, a hypothetical 
negotiation process will be modeled, using a game theory approach, that 
presents COLNAV with an option to improve its current position in the 
relationship.   
C.  THE DANGERS OF OUTSOURCING 
Paraphrasing Burt, Dobler, and Starling, there are a number of dangers 
associated with strategic outsourcing including COLNAV’s loss of control and 
skills that are a direct result of entrusting an important capacity to an external 
provider. An important amount of information required for future growth will not 
be communicated from the supplier as a consequence of inadequate contract 
management. 
Another important situation affecting COLNAV is the loss of strategic focus 
since the goals and objectives of Vertical de Aviacion may differ from COLNAV’s 
purposes, reducing operational results and effectiveness. 
Finally, there are major concerns related to the release of tactical, 
operational, and strategic information to a private company, without effective 
means to prevent intentional or unintentional disclosure of sensitive data.   
D. CONCLUSION 
Flight Support is an activity providing a sustained competitive advantage 
that COLNAV needs to accomplish its constitutional mission: it is a sine qua non 
condition for a number of COLNAV core competencies to be considered as such. 
Therefore, flight services should be the result of an internal capacity rather than  
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an outsourcing process. However, due to budgetary constraints and other 
limitations previously stated, COLNAV is forced to provide its troops with air 
mobility and support by means of external sources. 
 From an analysis of the buyer-supplier relationship, it was proven that 
COLNAV is in urgent need of alternative suppliers of air support. Not having such 
an option available in the near future, due to well-built entry-barriers for new 
companies, leaves COLNAV with only one path to follow: improving its current 
position with Vertical de Aviacion.  The first step toward achieving this is by 
revisiting the terms of the contract with its counterpart and seeking to obtain 
convenient conditions in which cooperation, flexibility, and knowledge-transfer 
occur. The following chapter aims to reach this goal by presenting a game theory 
approach to a hypothetical process of negotiation between COLNAV and Vertical 















IV. MODELING THE COLNAV’S OUTSOURCING OF CORE 
COMPETENCIES: A GAME THEORY APPROACH 
Opportunity is missed by most people because it is dressed in 
overalls and looks like work. 
— Thomas A. Edison 
 
COLNAV, surrounded by unbearable economic and legal obstacles, has 
only one course of action to achieve control and autonomy over the troops’ air 
support: conceive an innovative approach to a negotiation process with Vertical 
de Aviacion to obtain benefits other than just service.  This would be in an effort 
to build the required human and/or material support structure required to create 
and develop the internal capacities necessary to operate heavy helicopters. 
Without additional funds, there is no immediate solution for the situation 
affecting COLNAV in regards to massive air support. However, just like the most 
important values in life, such as happiness, self-esteem, and self-fulfillment, the 
best results for COLNAV can be achieved as a result of a delayed and indirect 
approach, a by-product of other activities. This chapter will show it. 
A. THE RATIONAL ACTOR  
Graham Allison and Phillip Zellikow, authors of one of the most influential 
books on foreign relationships, “Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban 
Missile Crisis,” provide the behavioral basis that will be assumed for COLNAV 
and Vertical de Aviacion in the negotiation process analyzed in this chapter. 
The Rational Actor Model, as devised by Allison and Zellikow, is 
characterized by the fact that it seeks to explain an action (a behavior that 
reflects a purpose or an intention).  To do so, it defines parties as rational actors 
who execute actions as a result of a calculated solution to a particular problem. 
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The option selected by each party can be explained (and understood) by 
presenting the goal that it is pursuing as well as available alternatives, showing 
that the one selected is the most reasonable choice (or value-maximizing), for its 
proposed objectives.45  
The process that a decision-maker has to track has the following steps: 1. 
determination of goals and objectives, 2. alternatives, 3. consequences, and 4. 
choices. Those are interdependent variables, meaning that in order to make his 
decision, the leader must properly evaluate them and consider the causes and 
effects prior to selecting the most convenient option. 
According to Robert Jervis, processes cannot be understood by summing 
up the characteristics of the parts or the bilateral interactions between pairs of 
them.46 Moreover, actions often interact and produce results that cannot be 
comprehended by linear models, which is the most common type of relationship 
between inputs and outputs. Therefore, what must be taken into consideration 
during the COLNAV-Vertical de Aviacion negotiation process is that a small 
amount of change in a variable can produce a disproportionate result at one end 
of its range. 
COLNAV, performing as a rational actor, will seek to improve the current 
position against its counterpart by modifying specific and perhaps, imperceptible, 
conditions of the agreement in order to produce dramatic and positive results. 
These outcomes might not be available immediately but, as Jervis states, “many 
crucial effects are delayed and indirect…indirect effects may be more important 
than direct ones.”47 Moreover, a direct approach is not an option for COLNAV 
since it is negotiating from a weak position; its goal, therefore, will be achieved in 
the form of a by-product resulting from a different action.   
                                            
45 Graham Allison and Phillip Zellikow, “Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile 
Crisis,” 2nd Ed., Longman, New York, 1999.  
46 Robert Jervis, “System Effects, Complexity in Political and Social Life,” Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1997.  
47 Ibid., p. 29. 
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B. DEFINITIONS 
1. Partial Conflicts 
Paraphrasing Phillip Straffin,48 Game Theory uses mathematical tools to 
study situations involving both conflict and cooperation. The players in a game 
choose from a list of available courses of action in order to define their strategies. 
Such decisions give form to the game’s outcomes. The players have preferences 
for the outcomes, meaning that they like some more than others. 
Partial-conflicts or non-zero-sum games involve situations in which the 
interests of players are not strictly opposed, and not strictly coincident. The game 
combines competitive aspects with some opportunities for cooperation, and is  
solved in accordance with assumptions made about how the players can 
communicate with each other. 
There are three different approaches to solving a non-zero-sum game 
based on the interactions between players: with or without communications, and 
through a Nash Arbitration. The latter will be implemented in the COLNAV-VA 
negotiation process.  
2. Nash Arbitration  
One method for solving cooperative, partial-conflicts when two players 
have a number of outcomes available and presented in such a way that they 
cannot concur on a solution but are willing to call an impartial outside arbitrator,  
and sit down together to decide what is a reasonable or fair outcome to the 
game, and then agree to implement that outcome, is called Nash Arbitration.49 
John Nash, father of the arbitration scheme, demonstrated that, if the involved 
parties failed to agree on a solution, they would get a default outcome 
                                            
48 Phillip D. Straffin, “Game Theory and Strategy,” The Mathematical Association of America, 
New York, 1975. 
49 Ibid., 105. 
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representing a status-quo point (SQ) in a convex polygon resulting from the 
collection of outcomes in a coordinate plane. 
The SQ represents the outcome for each party without having to 
cooperate with its counterpart, a security level from which negotiations begin, 
and therefore no player would accept an outcome below this value. 
The Nash Arbitration Model proposes a method to produce a solution in a 
convex polygon with an SQ in it, providing the confronting parties with an optimal 
and fair outcome. In order to implement this arbitration scheme, four axioms 
need to be true: 
1. Rationality: The solution point should be in the negotiation set. 
2. Linear Invariance: If either player’s utilities are transformed by a positive 
linear function, the solution point should be transformed by the same function. 
3. Symmetry: If the polygon happens to be symmetric about the line of 
slope +1 through SQ, then the solution point should be in this line. 
4. Independent of Irrelevant Alternatives: Irrelevant alternatives cannot 
change the solution point. 
There is only one arbitration scheme which satisfies axioms 1 through 4. It 
is this: if SQ =  (x0, y0), then the arbitrated solution point N is the point (x, y) in the 
polygon with x ≥ x0 and y ≥ y0, which maximizes the product (x – x0)(y – y0).50 
3. Pareto Optimal Solution  
Citing Straffin, “an outcome of a game is considered non-Pareto-optimal if 
there is another outcome which would give both players higher payoffs, or would 
give one player the same payoff but the other player a higher payoff. An outcome 
is Pareto Optimal if there is no such other outcome….Pareto principle: to be 
acceptable as a solution to a game, an outcome should be Pareto Optimal.”51  
                                            
50 Nash Theorem, as quoted in Straffin, 106. 
51 Straffin, 68. 
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4. Security Level 
A player’s security level is the value for the game that he can guarantee 
for himself even if the other player abandons his payoffs and minimizes his 
opponent’s payoffs instead. In this case, it represents the worst that VA can do to 
the COLNAV and vice versa.  
C. THE SCENARIO 
The following scenario will be assumed in order to develop the model: 
COLNAV, aware that outsourcing one of the activities enabling its core 
competencies ―the air support― reduces its own strategic flexibility to execute 
military operations in the time and mode that it wants, defines as paramount the 
necessity for improving its troops’ air-support.  
Currently limited by legal issues, budgetary restrictions, and a weak 
relative position facing a sole source of service, the organization must explore 
alternatives. The first would be to improve its bargaining position against the 
supplier, and seek to obtain benefits other than just service in order to build the 
required human and/or material support structure required to create and develop 
the internal capacities to operate heavy helicopters. The second is to present 
sturdy arguments at superior decision-making levels supporting the need for the 
development of an in-house capability that creates the economic relationship 
under consideration in this paper.   
Vertical de Aviacion, on the other hand, owns the country’s largest fleet of 
commercial helicopters, dominating the Colombian market’s non-regular air 
transportation and thus controls the prices of flight-services. Knowing COLNAV’s 
limitations, Vertical de Aviacion (VA) would use its strong bargaining position to 
maintain a status-quo with COLNAV, taking advantage of the long-term 




Following are the necessary assumptions to develop the game and to 
understand both player’s arguments and objectives. 
Both players act rationally, meaning that both are seeking to obtain the 
best possible outcome. 
There are no external pressures or constraints affecting this game.   
COLNAV’s main interest is to improve its bargaining position in order to gain 
flexibility and set the basis for the development of a near-future capacity of troop 
transportation, while VA seeks to maintain the status-quo of the current 
relationship, knowing that as long as COLNAV does not develop an outsourced 
capacity, it represents a long-term, high profit, controlled agreement. 
There are no external changes affecting the player’s outcomes i.e. legal 
constraints remain equal, new sources do not enter the market, the COLNAV 
keeps demanding the air services, and VA remains the sole source. 
E. THE GAME 
The purpose of this game is to experiment with different interactions 
between COLNAV and VA, visualizing strengths and opportunities that allow the 
former to assume stronger and more beneficial positions with the latter. 
COLNAV has two alternatives in this game: 
Sign a contract with VA (S) 
Do not sign a contract with VA (NS) 
VA has two options as well: 
Maintain the status-quo (SQ) 
Accept modifications to the current terms of contract (NSQ) 
The resulting matrix will be as follows: 
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  VA  
  SQ NSQ  
 S a b  
COLNAV     
 NS c d  
     
Table 4.   COLNAV – VA Matrix of interactions 
1. Utilities 
Utilities for this game will be calculated on an ordinal basis, meaning that 
higher numbers represent more preferred outcomes. Since it is difficult to 
determine the actual utility of each of these rankings for the COLNAV or VA 
without further research beyond the scope of this thesis, it will be assumed that 
the ordinal utility of these rankings equals the cardinal utility; that is, four is two 
times as good as two, three is three times as good as one, etc.  Making this 
assumption is necessary in order to illustrate Nash arbitration;  however, in order 
to use this in practice, the decision makers would have to develop a utility scale 
placing all outcomes between the best and worst outcomes so that the 
differences between their choices are meaningful.  That is, they must develop an 
interval scale.   
2. COLNAV’s Options 
Framed by COLNAV’s main objective to improve its bargaining position 
against its supplier in order to obtain benefits other than just service, and to build 
the required human and material support structure required to create and 
develop internal capacities to operate heavy helicopters, the following are 
COLNAV’s options as presented in table 4: 
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Best Option (4): (S, NSQ) COLNAV signs a contract with VA under 
new terms of cooperation. Basically, COLNAV would introduce, as part of VA’s 
obligations, training flight crews and maintenance personnel to operate this type 
of aircraft. This option would provide COLNAV with qualified human resources to 
develop the required internal capacity for the near future. 
Second Best Option (3): (NS, SQ) COLNAV does not sign a contract 
with VA as a consequence of the inability, or lack of willingness, from the supplier 
to meet the new terms of the contract as stated by COLNAV. This option is 
considered second best since, at present, COLNAV is not restricted by the 
Colombian Aerocivil to buy services from domestic companies (no one can 
provide the requested service in the country) and, therefore, is free to go to the 
international market for better agreements, strengthening its relative position with 
its supplier, and thus reducing the Supply Risk factor. 
Third Option (2): (S, SQ) COLMAR’s demands for permanent air 
support, added to the supplier’s strong bargaining position, results in the renewal 
of the contract under its same initial terms. This situation does not present any 
favorable position for COLNAV since it is defined as a Transactional 
Relationship.52   
Fourth Option (1): (NS, NSQ) Although VA accepts changes, costs are 
increased and COLNAV cannot afford them. This is the worst-case scenario 
because COLNAV,  would not only be unable to renew the contract, which would 
leave COLMAR’s troops in a vulnerable situation, but it would also have to give 
up its goals and return to an unfavorable, but economically affordable agreement 
with VA. However, despite the downsides of this outcome, it would help COLNAV 
                                            
52 According to Burt, Dobler and Starling’s “World Class Supply Management,” this type of 
buyer-supplier relationship is defined by several characteristics:  
• An absence of concern by both parties about the other party’s well-being 
• Costs, data and forecasts are not shared 
• Price is the focus of the relationship 
Transactional suppliers tend to provide the minimum service required and are highly inflexible 
when flexibility is demanded (Burt et al,  82). 
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to stress at higher levels the imperative necessity of achieving an internal 
capacity of air transportation for its troops and an inflexible, non-cooperative 
supplier.   
3. VA’s Options 
Vertical de Aviacion wants to keep the current terms of the contract.  By 
doing so, COLNAV would never be able to develop the internal capacities 
required to operate heavy helicopters and thus would remain VA-dependent to 
accomplish its mission. Here are its options as presented in table 4: 
Best Option (4):  (S, SQ) COLNAV renews the contract under the same 
conditions. The VA retains its strong bargaining position without sharing 
knowledge with its customer.  
Second Option (3): (NS, NSQ) VA yields to COLNAV’s demands, 
however, the flight-hours’ cost is increased and COLNAV is not able to assume 
the marginal increments, so the contract is not signed. COLNAV would have to 
forgo buying its own aircraft and maintain the current status-quo of the 
agreement.  
Third Option (2): (S, NSQ) COLNAV renews the agreement, but under 
the terms of a new contract, VA is required to do on-the-job training for 
COLNAV’s crews and maintenance personnel. This contract involves knowledge 
transference that helps  COLNAV build its own capacities in the long run, but still 
represents a good deal for VA.  
Fourth Option (1): (NS, SQ) VA does not accept the new terms 
proposed by COLNAV, allowing the former to seek options among the 
international suppliers of flight services and thus reduce its bargaining power in 
the country. 
The ordinal outcomes are introduced to the original matrix, where an 
arrow-flow diagram is used to present the likely outcome of the game as seen in 
table 5. 
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  VA  
  SQ NSQ  
 S (2, 4) (4, 2)  
COLNAV     
 NS (3, 1) (1, 3)  
     
Table 5.   COLNAV – VA Matrix of Interactions with Utilities  
F. SOLVING THE GAME 
Table 5 can be described as follows: 
If COLNAV decides to sign the contract (S), VA would choose to maintain 
the status-quo of the agreement (SQ) obtaining a higher outcome than if it chose 
to modify the current terms of contract (NSQ) (outcomes for VA facing COLNAV-
S are 4 and 2 for SQ and NSQ, respectively). 
However, if VA decides to keep the current status (SQ), COLNAV would 
migrate from S to NS in search of a better outcome (3 instead of 2). 
Again, facing COLNAV’s decision not to sign the contract, VA would 
decide to accept the new terms (and also increment the costs of the contract) in 
order to improve its outcomes. (This decision will yield a new outcome of 3 
instead of 1 for VA). 
At this point, it will be assumed that COLNAV would find a way to sign the 
contract (probably reducing the number of flight hours to compensate for the 
costs increments), taking advantage of the new concessions offered by VA, in 
order to increase its outcome from 1 to 4. In this position, the game starts all over 
again. 
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The matrix movement diagram shows that there is no equilibrium in pure 
strategies; therefore, a mixed strategy for both players should be implemented in 
order to solve the game. 
1. COLNAV’s Security Level 
COLNAV is maximizing its security level’s outcomes while VA is trying to 
minimize COLNAV’s security level. 








Since there is no Saddlepoint, the game would be solved through mixed 
strategies: 
COLNAV’s Expected Outcome (EC) = VA SQ = VA NSQ  
EC = 2q + 3(1-q) = 4q + (1-q) 
Then, q = ½ and (1-q) = ½  






















2. VA’s Security Level 
VA is maximizing its outcomes while COLNAV is trying to minimize VA’s 
security level. 











Since there is no Saddlepoint, the matrix would be solved through mixed 
strategies: 
VA’s Expected Outcome (EV) = COLNAV S = COLNAV NS  
EV = 4p + 2(1-p) = p + 3(1-p) 
Then, p = ¼ and (1-p) = ¾   
























3.  Finding the Nash Point 
 
Figure 6.   Finding The Nash Point 
 
The Slope (m) for the Pareto Optimal Segment Line is determined by the 
following equation: 
  m = ∆ y / ∆x  (1)   
Using the values from (S, SQ) and (S, NSQ) to solve in (1): 


















2 ½  
Pareto Optimal Segment Line 
(2 ½ , 2 ½ ) 
(2 , 4 ) 
(4, 2 ) 
(2 ½ , y ) 
( x , 2 ½ ) 
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y = 3 ½  
Replacing again in (1) in order to solve for x:  
-1 = (3 ½ - 2 ½ )  / ( 2 ½ - x) 
x = 3 ½   
The Nash Arbitration Point is defined by the middle point of the Negotiation Set.   
Having calculated the values of x and y, the middle point is (3, 3).This is also the 
Nash Arbitration Point for this game. 
 
Figure 7.   COLNAV – VA Payoff Polygon 
 
Figure 6 shows the payoff polygon for this game, a graphical 
representation that indicates by its boundaries and interior, all possible 
combinations of strategies, while its corner-points represent pure strategies. 
Figure 7 shows the Nash Arbitration Point, the middle point in the segment line 
















Nash Arbitration Point 
(3, 3) 
VA’s Security Level 
COLNAV’s Security Level
2 ½  
2 ½  
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G. IMPLEMENTING THE NASH ARBITRATION POINT 
Solving by Nash Arbitration, with the player’s Security Levels as the 
status-quo point, indicates that both COLNAV and VA should do ½ (S, SQ) + ½ 
(S, NSQ) in order to obtain the highest payoff for each one. 
Considering that signing the contract (S) is a constant in both points of the 
Pareto Optimal Segment Line, COLNAV and VA should focus on negotiating the 
terms under which the training of crews and maintenance personnel should be 
provided.  
Game Theory provides a consistent course of action through which 
COLNAV can overcome its current weak position against its sole supplier. The 
key element to be introduced during the negotiations is to re-define the need to 
be outsourced; instead of buying flight services, COLNAV needs to purchase 
flight services and knowledge transference to develop its own internal capacities. 
Such a simple but powerful connotation will produce a dramatic change in the 
future development of the relationship. 
H. CONCLUSION  
Up to this point, the outcomes of the negotiation process for COLNAV 
were represented in the payoff polygon by the corner-point (S, SQ), the best 
alternative for VA (outcome of 4) and the second worst for COLNAV (outcome of 
2), resulting in iterative contracts with VA under unfavorable conditions for the 
Colombian government.  
The game theory model included an apparently minor modification to  
COLNAV’s demands to VA, which made the solution to migrate from a position of 
no cooperation at all, to an intermediate condition, to which some additional 
value and knowledge transference is present, and if the antecedents of this 
agreement are considered, something is better than nothing for COLNAV. 
The ultimate goal for COLNAV, the achievement of an internal capacity to 
massively transport and support its troops, might be attained in a short period as 
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a consequence of this indirect approach. It is clear that, as was stated before, 
COLNAV will keep outsourcing flight services until it develops the internal 
capacity to provide its troops with air support, despite the costs involved in the 
agreement (p.22). However, results from a different approach to the negotiation 
process, the second part of this statement―the development of the internal 
capacity―might become a real asset for COLNAV in the near future. There are 
two factors supporting this assumption: (1) in a short period, COLNAV would 
have well-suited personnel to operate heavy helicopters, solving one of the most 
hindering factors besides the economics, to in-source the required capacity. A 
reduction in costs derived from purchasing new equipment would act in favor of 
the COLNAV request for additional funds before the congress, and (2) once the 
skills and ability to operate and maintain the particular flight equipment become 
part of the COLNAV spectrum of competencies, the acquisition of new 
















V. CONCLUSION  
Our plans miscarry because they have no aim. When a man does 
not know what harbor he is making for, no wind is the right wind. 
Seneca 
 
COLNAV, strongly limited by economic and legal constraints, found a way 
to provide its troops with flight support in an agreement with a private supplier 
funded with the operational budget. When it was first conceived, the idea of 
outsourcing flight services solved an urgent need and, therefore, received 
approval at different levels of the organization. However, it has been almost five 
years since then, and what was initially considered as a “life-preserver” for the 
troops who needed a flexible, rapid response to cope with increasing ONT 
threats in their jurisdiction, has now turned into a permanent agreement providing 
COLNAV with nothing but aerial transportation service. This service is provided 
in terms that the supplier decides is convenient for its interests, which in many 
cases happen to be in conflict with  COLNAV’s,  and therefore limit the 
employment of its resources and initiatives, which are to eliminate the threats of 
a narco-terrorist organization affecting not only Colombia, but the entire world 
with its illicit drugs.  
The ultimate goal of this document is not to provide a perfect solution to a 
complex problem that affects an entire organization, but just to highlight the fact 
that the critical competency of a military branch of the country is being managed 
with a short-term mindset, a day-by-day approach that will only contribute to 
aggravate the problem in the long run.  
There is an urgent need to change the conditions under which COLNAV is 
providing support to its members, and it might be as easy as realizing the long-
term benefits that will produce an internal capacity of air support and mobility. 
James Q. Wilson refers to former secretary of defense Robert McNamara’s 
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actions to describe the adequate public-administration skills required for a leader 
to succeed in a bureaucratic environment, “[McNamara] believed that the 
defense budget should not be set on the basis of the political preferences of the 
president nor the logrolling tendencies of the services but rather on the basis of 
what it would cost to have the ‘correct’ mix of troops and weapons to achieve the 
stated goals of defense policy.”53 The decision-makers who succeed are those 
capable of combining a clear vision of their agencies’ goals with the ability to 
communicate that vision effectively and motivate the key civil servants to act on 
it. Wilson calls it “strategic governance”54 and that is what is required to 
transform COLNAV’s spectrum of possibilities to produce real benefits to the 
organization. 
In order to help build a consistent, clear vision, Chapter III presented a 
managerial analysis of a counterproductive relationship for COLNAV. Good 
arguments can be extracted from the theoretical framework to support a request 
for additional funds before the congress, especially the strategic weaknesses 
generated from a critical, transactional relationship with one source of supply, 
requiring COLNAV to offer inducements in order to receive the proper service.   
In the meantime, in the next negotiation process with Vertical de Aviacion, 
the Game Theory model in Chapter IV might be useful for presenting a good 
example of the potential large benefits that can be obtained from a minor 
modification in the terms of the contract. Even though an indirect approach to 
negotiations could be very important for achieving COLNAV’s goals, a change in 
attitude is vital for the organization to progress.  
It has to become part of the mindset of the entire service that to make the 
most of its highest-value asset ―the people― it is absolutely necessary to wisely 
invest the scarce economic resources available to accomplish the mission. This 
concept is applicable not only to this particular scenario, but to the general way of 
                                            
53 James Q. Wilson, “Bureaucracy, What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It,” 
Basic Books, United States of America, 2000. 
54 Ibid,  213. 
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doing business in the organization. A sense of urgency is also required in order 
to produce real changes in the immediate future. That is the only alternative 
COLNAV has in this context. 
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